@techreport{Guth2008Prior,
abstract = {Similar to welfare economics where with(out) interpersonal comparisons one defines unique (set-valued) welfare (Pareto) optima, we present a framework for one-person decision making where with(out) a prior probability distribution individual optimality prescribes usually a unique (set of) choice(s). Satisfiable aspirations in the sense that there exists some choice guaranteeing them define a much larger choice set whose intersection with the set of prior-free optimal choices is never empty. We also review experimental procedures and results which incentivize aspiration formation and reject even prior-free optimality experimentally.},
address = {Jena},
author = {Werner G\"{u}th},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {B4; D81; D10; Satisficing; bounded rationality; optimality; Beschr\"{a}nkte Rationalit\"{a}t; Entscheidung; Test},
language = {eng},
number = {2008,055},
publisher = {Universit\"{a}t Jena und Max-Planck-Institut f\"{u}r \"{O}konomik},
title = {Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation},
type = {Jena economic research papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25739},
year = {2008}
}
