@techreport{Schottner2005Relational,
abstract = {This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.},
address = {Berlin},
author = {Anja Sch\"{o}ttner},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {M51; M54; 330; job design; multi-tasking; relational contracts},
language = {eng},
number = {2005,052},
publisher = {SFB 649, Economic Risk},
title = {Relational contracts and job design},
type = {SFB 649 discussion paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071},
year = {2005}
}
