@techreport{Schottner2005Fixed,
abstract = {This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.},
address = {Berlin},
author = {Anja Sch\"{o}ttner},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D44; H57; L15; 330; innovation contest; auction; tournament; quality},
language = {eng},
number = {2005,041},
publisher = {SFB 649, Economic Risk},
title = {Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests},
type = {SFB 649 discussion paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25050},
year = {2005}
}
