@techreport{CerqueraDussan2007Durable,
abstract = {We develop a model of R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant with network externalities and durable goods. We show that the threat of entry eliminates the commitment problem that an incumbent may face in its R&D decision due to the goods? durability. Moreover, a potential entrant over-invests in R&D and an established incumbent might exhibit higher, equal or lower R&D investments in comparison with the social optimum. In our model, the incumbent?s commitment problem and the efficiency of its R&D level are determined by the extent of the network externalities.},
address = {Mannheim},
author = {Daniel Cerquera Duss\'{a}n},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {O31; L13; D85; D21; 330; Network externalities; Durable Goods; Innovation; Imperfect Competition; Innovationswettbewerb; Potenzieller Wettbewerb; Dauerhaftes Konsumgut; Network Externalities; Industrielle Forschung; Investition; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {07-086},
publisher = {Zentrum f\"{u}r Europ\"{a}ische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)},
title = {Durable Goods, Innovation and Network Externalities},
type = {ZEW Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24670},
year = {2007}
}
