@techreport{Breitscheidel2005Self,
abstract = {We consider the application of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms in environmental
regulation and explore the question whether these mechanisms yield strong
investment incentives in a market with many firms under Cournot competition. It
turns out that the tax/subsidy mechanism with the announcement of the subsidy rate
and the tax/subsidy mechanism with the announcement of the tax rate work for an
arbitrary number of firms, which means that they yield strong incentives for investing
in environmentally friendly technologies. The announcement of the subsidy rate is
preferable for solving hold-up problems.},
address = {Mannheim},
author = {J\"{o}rg Breitscheidel},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {Q28; L50; D62; D43; 330; Hold-up problems; Environmental regulation; Taxes and subsidies; Selffinancing mechanisms; Emission control; Umweltschutzinvestition; Umweltpolitik; Umweltabgabe; Subvention; Steueraufkommen; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Theorie; hold-up problems},
language = {eng},
number = {05-87},
publisher = {Zentrum f\"{u}r Europ\"{a}ische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)},
title = {Self-financing Tax/Subsidy Mechanisms in Environmental Regulation with Many Firms},
type = {ZEW Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24183},
year = {2005}
}
