@techreport{Tykvova2005Chooses,
abstract = {Syndication, which is a joint realization of one project/one
investment by several capital providers, is a long existing phenomenon
that plays a central role in many financial market segments. Within
this paper we develop a theoretical model focusing on the dynamic
aspect of syndication, namely the know-how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysis
checks whether repeated relationships and, thus, reputational concerns
outweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract.
Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first consists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals.
The second focuses on who chooses whom. We show that experienced
financiers may partner with either other experienced investors (in order to raise the success probability of a project) or with unskilled
investors (who can gain knowledge). We further demonstrate that
sometimes the syndication is impeded because the financier believes
that his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract
(hold-up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem).},
address = {Mannheim},
author = {Tereza Tykvov\'{a}},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D83; L14; G32; 330; Syndication; Hold-up; Reputation; Learning; Projektfinanzierung; Investition; Finanzierung; Unternehmenskooperation; Wissenstransfer; Lernprozess; Prestige; Sunk Costs; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {05-74},
publisher = {Zentrum f\"{u}r Europ\"{a}ische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)},
title = {Who Chooses Whom? Syndication, Skills and Reputation},
type = {ZEW Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24170},
year = {2005}
}
