@techreport{Bickenbach2000Regulation,
abstract = {The paper starts with a description of major reforms of EU policy in the network
industries. Based on the normative economics of regulation, it then points out
generic information and transaction cost problems of regulatory policy making.
An appropriate allocation of regulatory competencies may help mitigate these
problems. Focusing on the `federal' allocation of competencies it is argued that
traditional economic theories of federalism should be complemented by
contract-theoretic and transaction-cost-political approaches. There has been some progress in recent years in developing such a `new economic theory of
federalism'. Basic ideas and some insights of this theory are discussed with
regard to the appropriate `federal' allocation of competencies for the regulation
of the European network industries.},
address = {Kiel},
author = {Frank Bickenbach},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; H11; H77; L43; L51; D7; 330; network industries; regulation; asymmetric information; incomplete contracts; economic models of federalism; Netzzugang; Regulierung; Asymmetrische Information; Unvollst\"{a}ndiger Vertrag; Transaktionskosten; F\"{o}deralismus; Verfassungs\"{o}konomik; EU-Politik; Theorie; EU-Staaten},
language = {eng},
number = {977},
publisher = {Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)},
title = {Regulation of Europe's network industries : the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism},
type = {Kiel Working Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2409},
year = {2000}
}
