@techreport{Voigtlander2004Perfect,
abstract = {In the present paper the effects of different pay-as-you-go pension systems on fertility
decisions of a representative household are examined. Thereby, the analysis focuses
especially on the interplay of parental quantity and quality decisions, introduced by Becker
(1960). As it will be shown, a traditional pay-as-you-go system in either case distorts
decisions of parents leading to an erosion of the financial basis of the system. In contrast, the
assessment of a child-related pay-as-you-go system is ambiguous. If parents are solely
responsible for expenditures on the quality of children, it is inefficient, too. However, if it is
combined with a device like public education, optimality can be restored.},
author = {Michael Voigtl\"{a}nder},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D10; H55; I20; 330; Pay-as-you-go; child-related pension; quantity and quality of children; Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung; Umlageverfahren; Familienleistungsausgleich; Bildungsinvestition; Bildungspolitik; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2004,02},
title = {A Perfect Marriage: Child-related Pensions and Public Education},
type = {Diskussionspapiere / Otto-Wolff-Institut f\"{u}r Wirtschaftsordnung},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23835},
year = {2004}
}
