@techreport{Bolle2007Price,
abstract = {If a previously unpaid activity (donating blood) is paid then we often observe that this activity is reduced. In this paper, it is hypothesised that the price offered is taken as a proxy for the "market value" of the activity. Depending on how the actor valued the activity previously, crowding-out or crowding-in, as well as persistence (or not) of the effect after the abandoning of payment is implied. This "naive" explanation is confronted with B\'{e}nabou and Tirole\textasciiacute{}s (2003) priciple-agent model where the opposite signalling effect is hypothesised: a higher price is taken as an indication for a lower value.},
author = {Friedel Bolle},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H42; D64; D82; 330; Intrinsic Motivation; Crowding-out; Signaling; Preis; Signalling; Motivation; Crowding out; Altruismus; Blutspende; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {250},
title = {A Price is a signal: on intrinsic motivation and crowding-out},
type = {Diskussionspapiere / Europa-Universit\"{a}t Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakult\"{a}t},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23820},
year = {2007}
}

