@techreport{Eggert2003Taxation,
abstract = {This paper examines information sharing between governments in an optimaltaxation
framework. We present a taxonomy of alternative systems of international
capital-income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and
information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion of the previous
literature that integration of international capital markets may lead to the
under-provision of publicly provided goods. However, different to the existing
literature under-provision occurs because of inefficiently coordinated expectations.
We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of
public-good provision and complete and voluntary information exchange between
national tax authorities.},
author = {Wolfgang Eggert and Martin Kolmar},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H21; F42; F20; 330; tax competition; information exchange; Kapitalertrag; Internationaler Finanzmarkt; Informationsverhalten; Steuerwettbewerb; \"{O}ffentliches Gut; Theorie; information sharing},
language = {eng},
number = {03/07},
title = {The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox},
type = {Discussion paper series / Universit\"{a}t Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE)},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23558},
year = {2003}
}
