@techreport{Winston2000positional,
abstract = {The market for undergraduate education has many similarities to an arms race. A school?s
position \textendash{} relative to other schools \textendash{} determines its success in attracting students and student
quality. Its position, in turn, is largely determined by the size of its student subsidies, the
difference between its educational spending and the net tuition it charges its students (or, much
the same thing, how much their students have to pay for a dollar?s worth of educational
spending). High-subsidy schools spend the most per dollar of tuition so that ?bargain? attracts
the highest quality students. To change its position, a school must spend more or charge less \textendash{} and find the resources to support it. The positional arms race suggests why competition from a
school further down in the hierarchy forces a response more effectively than competition from
above and why it?s been typical of higher education that costs rise to reposition, but prices don?t
fall.},
author = {Gordon C. Winston},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {330; Studium; Subvention; Studienfinanzierung; Wettbewerb; USA},
language = {eng},
number = {54},
title = {The positional arms race in higher education},
type = {WPEHE discussion paper series / Williams College, Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23501},
year = {2000}
}
