@techreport{Benabou2004Incentives,
abstract = {We build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and
greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments
creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this ?overjustification
effect? can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The
model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior,
and those where disclosing one?s generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium
contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality or publicity of incentives.
Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social
welfare by requiring agents to engage in inefficient sacrifices.},
author = {Roland B\'{e}nabou and Jean Tirole},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; H41; D64; Z13; 330; altruism; rewards; motivation; overjustification effect; crowding out; identity; social norms.; Altruismus; Leistungsmotivation; Prestige; Soziale Norm},
language = {ger},
number = {230},
title = {Incentives and Prosocial Behavior},
type = {Discussion papers in economics / Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23457},
year = {2004}
}
