@techreport{Bannier2005Heterogeneous,
abstract = {This paper studies optimal risk-taking and information disclosure by firms that
obtain financing from both a ?relationship? bank and ?arm?s-length? banks. We find
that firm decisions are asymmetrically influenced by the degree of heterogeneity
among banks: lowly-collateralized firms vary optimal risk and information
precision along with the degree of relationship lending for projects with low
expected cash-flows, while highly-collateralized firms do so for projects with high
expected cash-flows. Incidences of inefficient project liquidation are minimized if
the former firms rely on relationship banking to a low degree, the latter to a large
degree.},
author = {Christina E. Bannier},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; L14; G21; 330; Risk; Relationship Lending; Asymmetric Information; Liquidity Crisis; Efficiency; Finanzierungstheorie; Kredit; Bank; Risikomanagement; Investor Relations; Projektfinanzierung; Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {148},
title = {Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing, Optimal Business Risk and Information Disclosure},
type = {Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universit\"{a}t Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23413},
year = {2005}
}
