@techreport{Raviv2004Role,
abstract = {I study the sequence of bidding in an open-outcry English auction to examine
how the strategic bidding process affects price determination. I do this by studying the
anomalous nature of ?jump bidding? in data I have collected from a series of public
auctions of used cars in New Jersey. Jump bidding occur when a new offer is submitted
that is above the old offer plus the minimum bid increment permitted. I find that jump
biddings are an empirical regularity in all items sold. The jumps are a function of the
presale estimate of the item?s price but are not affected by the selling order. I suggest a
way to use the Jump Biddings to determine whether an open-outcry auction is best
interpreted with models that assume private-or common-item valuations, and conclude
that these auctions are consistent with the common values interpretation.},
author = {Yaron Raviv},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D44; 330; Auction; Auktionstheorie; Marktmechanismus},
language = {eng},
number = {04,11},
title = {The Role of the Bidding Process in Price Determination : Jump Bidding in Sequential English Auctions},
type = {Working paper series / Claremont McKenna College},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23398},
year = {2004}
}

