@techreport{Voigt2005Economic,
abstract = {Judicial independence is not only a necessary condition for the impartiality
of judges, it can also endanger it: judges that are independent could have
incentives to remain uninformed, become lazy or even corrupt. It is
therefore often argued that judicial independence and judicial
accountability are competing ends. In this paper, it is, however,
hypothesized that they are not necessarily competing ends but can be
complementary means towards achieving impartiality and, in turn, the rule
of law. It is further argued that judicial accountability can increase per
capita income through various channels one of which is the reduction of
corruption. First tests concerning the economic effects of JA are carried out
drawing on the absence of corruption within the judiciary as well as data
gathered by the U.S. State Department as proxies. On the basis of 75
countries, these proxies are highly significant for explaining differences in
per capita income.},
author = {Stefan Voigt},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {K40; H11; P51; O40; 330; Judicial Independence; judicial accountability; rule of law; economic growth; corruption; constitutional political economy; Gerichtsbarkeit; Justiz; Verantwortung; Wirtschaftswachstum; Korruption; Sch\"{a}tzung; Welt},
language = {eng},
number = {72},
title = {The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability : Some Preliminary Insights},
type = {Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeitr\"{a}ge / Universit\"{a}t Kassel, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23291},
year = {2005}
}
