@techreport{Chaudhuri2003free,
abstract = {We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or
intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free
riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than
deciding on a case by case basis as in the continuous feedback treatment.},
author = {Ananish Chaudhuri and DeeDee Chen and Sara Graziano and Frances McIntire and Dawn Winkler},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; C92; C91; 330; Public Goods ; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ; Patterned Feedback ; Free riding ; Expectations; \"{O}ffentliches Gut; Spieltheorie; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Experiment},
language = {eng},
number = {2003,02},
title = {To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game},
type = {Working Papers / Wellesley College, Department of Economics},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23220},
year = {2003}
}
