@techreport{Prusa2002Modern,
abstract = {In this paper we study worldwide antidumping (AD) case filing patterns in order to
determine the extent to which economic versus strategic incentives explain the behavior of countries
employing AD actions. We compare four main hypotheses. Two are motivated by the Bagwell-
Staiger (1990) model of special protection and are consistent with the view that AD actions are used
to prevent unfair trade: the ?big supplier? and the ?big change in imports? hypotheses. The other
two hypotheses, tit-for-tat and the club effect, are outside the basic Bagwell-Staiger model and are
consistent with the belief that strategic considerations influence AD actions. We find strong support
that AD actions are directed at big suppliers, but far weaker evidence that AD actions are filed
against suppliers whose imports have ?surged.? This finding casts doubt on the view that AD
actions are primarily used to stop unfair trade practices because one would expect that such
practices would be associated with large import gains. We also find very strong evidence that AD
actions are used strategically to deter further use of AD and/or to punish trading partners who have
used AD. Our findings reject the notion that the rise in AD activity is solely explained by an
increase in unfair trading.},
author = {Thomas J. Prusa and Susan Skeath},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {330; Antidumping; Retorsionsma\ss{}nahme; Welt},
language = {eng},
number = {2002,05},
title = {Modern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade or Retaliation?},
type = {Working Papers / Wellesley College, Department of Economics},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23215},
year = {2002}
}
