@techreport{Campbell2003Implementation,
abstract = {We explore the relationship between public information and implementable
outcomes in an environment characterized by random endowments and private
information. We show that if public signals carry no information about private
types, then an exact relationship holds: a more informative public signal structure,
in the sense of Blackwell, induces a smaller set of ex-ante implementable
social choice functions. This holds for a large set of implementation standards,
including Nash implementation, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. The result
extends the notion, dating to Hirshleifer (1971), that public information
can have negative value to an endowment economy under uncertainty.},
author = {Colin M. Campbell},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {330; Implementation; Blackwell?s Ordering; Information; Risk Sharing; Information; Informationswert; Ranking-Verfahren; Theorie; Blackwell's criterion},
language = {eng},
number = {2003,03},
title = {Implementation and Orderings of Public Information},
type = {Working papers / Rutgers University, Department of Economics},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23161},
year = {2003}
}
