@techreport{Jost2004Preemptive,
abstract = {Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents? strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, there may be either a first-mover or a second-mover advantage. Under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium, but he will not implement first-best efforts although the agents are risk neutral.},
author = {Peter-J\"{u}rgen Jost and Matthias Kr\"{a}kel},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {M5; M12; J3; 330; preemption; tournaments; Agency Theory; Wettbewerb; Spieltheorie; Theorie; Tournament},
language = {eng},
number = {2004,21},
title = {Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22898},
year = {2004}
}
