@techreport{Krakel2004Sabotage,
abstract = {In a contest players compete for winning a prize by exerting effort and thereby increasing
their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative
position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with
heterogeneous and homogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our
results suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of
different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur?s identity is revealed sabotage
decreases while retaliation motives prevail.},
author = {Matthias Kr\"{a}kel and Bernd Irlenbusch and Christine Harbring and Reinhard Selten},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C91; C72; J33; J41; 330; Contest; Experiments; Sabotage; Tournament; Wettbewerb; Experiment; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Theorie; Tournament},
language = {eng},
number = {2004,12},
title = {Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests An Experimental Analysis},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22890},
year = {2004}
}
