@techreport{Nautz2003Overbidding,
abstract = {This paper investigates various theories explaining banks' overbid-
ding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB).
Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show
that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbid-
ding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at
neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbid-
ding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged.},
author = {Dieter Nautz and J\"{o}rg Oechssler},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D44; E32; 330; Overbidding; repo auctions; monetary policy instruments of the European Central Bank; Pensionsgesch\"{a}ft; Zins; Bank; Auktionstheorie; Europ\"{a}ische Wirtschafts- und W\"{a}hrungsunion; EU-Staaten; Zinstender},
language = {eng},
number = {2003,1},
title = {Overbidding in fixed rate tenders - an empirical assessment of alternative explanations},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22860},
year = {2003}
}
