@techreport{Roider2003Delegation,
abstract = {In a holdup framework, I provide conditions under which simple delegation of authority is
a solution to the complete-contracting problem even though ex-post actions are ex-ante contractible,
and unlimited transfer payments are feasible. In particular, delegation turns out
to be optimal if the payoff functions of the parties satisfy certain separability and symmetry
conditions, and the parties face an underinvestment problem. This result is extended to the
case of potential overinvestment and to multi-dimensional effort provision. Besides providing a
complete-contracting rationale for delegation, the findings contribute to the foundation of incomplete
contracts and the property-rights theory of the firm.},
author = {Andreas Roider},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L22; D82; L14; D23; 330; delegation; decentralization; authority; incomplete contracts; holdup; property rights; Kooperative F\"{u}hrung; Dezentrale Organisation; Unvollst\"{a}ndiger Vertrag; Eigentumsrechtstheorie; Investition; Sunk Costs; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2003,8},
title = {Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22837},
year = {2003}
}
