@techreport{Bos2003Aggressiveness,
abstract = {In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage
in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to produce as a result of the
existens of externalities in the conflict equilibrium. We were able to show the following results: (i) In some situations Pareto-improving redistribution occurs
voluntarily. (ii) Otherwise, the government may choose an indirect way to improve production in the presence of appropriation: In a situation of partial anarchy in
some market redistributive policies in other markets may help to reduce the inefficiency in the anarchic market.},
author = {Dieter B\"{o}s and Martin Kolmar},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D30; D74; D23; 330; Anarchy; Contests; Redistribution; Einkommensumverteilung; Verteilungskonflikt; Spieltheorie; Eigentumsrechtstheorie; Anarchie; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2003,2},
title = {Aggressiveness and Redistribution},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22835},
year = {2003}
}
