@techreport{Krakel2003Splitting,
abstract = {Splitting leagues or tournaments seems to be puzzling when agents are
homogeneous and splitting leads to a negative competition effect. However,
it can be shown that the principal can nevertheless benefit from splitting.
First, splitting can be used as a divide-and-rule strategy by the principal
to create additional incentives when collusion among the agents is possible.
Second, splitting leagues gives the principal the opportunity to introduce
promotions and relegations between nested tournaments (i.e., tournaments
that are intertemporally linked), which also enhances incentives.},
author = {Matthias Kr\"{a}kel},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {M5; J4; J3; 330; collusion; leagues; promotion; relegation; tournaments; Agency Theory; Wettbewerb; Theorie; tournaments},
language = {eng},
number = {2003,6},
title = {Splitting Leagues},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22834},
year = {2003}
}
