@techreport{Neugebauer2002Individual,
abstract = {This article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has
been designed to test the Nash equilibrium predictions of individual bidding behavior.
Subjects faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with
computerized bids. Three treatments were considered which varied with the conditions
of information feedback. In earlier experimental work an overbidding above the risk
neutral Nash equilibrium has been frequently reported. Our data provide evidence that
this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback
in auction experiments of revealing only the winning bid after each auction. By means
of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics. Finally we
apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of the individual bidding
behavior.},
author = {Tibor Neugebauer and Reinhard Selten},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C12; C92; C72; C13; D44; 330; Experimental economics; first-price sealed-bid auctions; independent private value model; computerized competitors; bidding theory; risk aversion; Auktionstheorie; Informationsverhalten; Experiment; Nash-Gleichgewicht},
language = {eng},
number = {2003,3},
title = {Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22831},
year = {2002}
}
