@techreport{Hain2002Delegation,
abstract = {Why do political constituencies delegate decision power to representative assemblies? And how is the size of such assemblies determined? We analyze these questions of constitutional design in a model with voters learning their preferred alternative only after engaging in costly information gathering. We show that there is an optimal assembly size that would be chosen at a constitutional stage. This implies a relationship between assembly and constituency size. We then compared this relationship to actual data. Fitting a single parameter to the data, we show that our model can explain the actual relationship between assembly and constituency size quite well.},
author = {Roland Hain and Manipushpak Mitra},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D72; P16; D82; 330; Constitutional Design; Representative Democracy; Parliament Size; Information Costs; Demokratie; Parlament; Verfassungs\"{o}konomik; Informationskosten; Sch\"{a}tzung; Theorie; EU-Staaten; Deutschland; Schweiz},
language = {eng},
number = {2002,17},
title = {The Delegation Perspective on Representative Democracy},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22827},
year = {2002}
}
