@techreport{Gautier2002Financing,
abstract = {In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second property is self-selection for the less efficient firms. The third property is that the mechanism is a third best one. In other words, as long as the budget-constraint is binding, the optimal output is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. Finally, if the budget constraint is too strong, then we have a full bunching solution.},
author = {Axel Gautier and Manipushpak Mitra},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H42; D82; L51; 330; Regulation; Asymmetric Information; Budget Constraint; Infrastrukturinvestition; Haushaltskonsolidierung; Asymmetrische Information; Budgetrestriktion; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2002,15},
title = {Financing Infrastructure under Budget Constraint},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22825},
year = {2002}
}
