@techreport{Pausch2005Credit,
abstract = {The standard situation of ex post information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders is extended by risk aversion and heterogenous levels of reservation utility of lenders. In a situation of direct contracting optimal incentive compatible contracts are valuable for both, borrowers and lenders. However, there may appear credit rationing as a consequence of borrowers optimal decision making. Introducing a bank into the market increases total wealth due to the appearance of a portfolio effect in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. It can be shown that this effect may even reduce the problem of credit rationing provided it is su?ciently strong.},
author = {Thilo Pausch},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L22; G21; D82; 330; risk aversion; costly state verification; credit rationing; bank},
language = {eng},
number = {271},
title = {Credit Risk, Credit Rationing, and the Role of Banks: The Case of Risk Averse Lenders},
type = {Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe / Institut f\"{u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit\"{a}t Augsburg},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22794},
year = {2005}
}
