@techreport{Filipova2005Reducing,
abstract = {We examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing behavior of insureds in automobile insurance markets both for perfect competition and for monopoly. Specifically, we assume that insurers can offer a contract with information revelation ex post, i.e., after an accident has occurred, in addition to the usual second-best contracts. Under moral hazard this always leads to a Paretoimprovement of social welfare. For adverse selection we find that this is also true except when bad risks under self-selecting contracts received an information rent, i.e., under monopoly or under competition with cross-subsidization from low to high risks. Regulation can be used to establish Pareto-improvement also in these cases. Privacy concerns do not alter our positive welfare results.},
author = {Lilia Filipova and Peter Welzel},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; G22; 330; information moral hazard; adverse selection; insurance},
language = {eng},
number = {270},
title = {Reducing Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Cars with Black Boxes},
type = {Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe / Institut f\"{u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit\"{a}t Augsburg},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22793},
year = {2005}
}
