@techreport{Sulzle2004Duopolistic,
abstract = {This paper studies imperfect price competition between two intermediaries in an electronic business-to-business
matching market with indirect network externalities. The intermediaries differ with regard to their ownership structure:
an independent third party incumbent marketplace competes with a challenging collaborative buy-side consortium
marketplace in terms of attracting buying and selling firms. When firms can register exclusively with at most one
intermediary, the incumbent is only able to deter entry if the number of firms taking ownership in the consortium is
sufficiently small. Otherwise, the consortium can successfully enter and monopolize the market. When firms can multihome,
i.e. they register simultaneously with both intermediaries, the consortium can always enter while both
intermediaries stay in the market with positive profits.},
author = {Kai S\"{u}lzle},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L13; L11; C78; L22; 330; B2B e-commerce; intermediation; network externalities; matching; Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung; E-Business; Duopol; Preiswettbewerb; Network Externalities; Intermedi\"{a}r},
language = {eng},
number = {09/04},
title = {Duopolistic Competition between Independent and Collaborative Business-to-Business Marketplaces},
type = {Dresden discussion paper in economics},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22713},
year = {2004}
}
