@techreport{Sander1998Strategisches,
abstract = {Governments may draft contracts with market agents for allocating subsidies
and pursuing specific policy goals. Contract enforcement via binding
commitments is difficult, however, when exogenous (environmental)
and endogenous (behavioural) risks interact. Analyzing the old debt
compromise in east German housing, it results that a sophisticated design
of contractual incompleteness may provide a reasonable safeguard
against opportunistic behaviour. Yet it involves considerable costs and
still does not guarantee that policy goals are achieved. The crucial policy
question is if contracts can be drafted without creating a one-sided holdup
potential or if governments should not co-operate with market agents
but commit to policy rules.},
address = {Kiel},
author = {Birgit Sander},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C71; C78; D82; H54; K12; P20; P30; 330; Wohnungspolitik; Wohnungsbaufinanzierung; Privatisierung; Unvollst\"{a}ndiger Vertrag; Transaktionskosten; Anreizvertrag; Verhandlungstheorie; Neue Bundesl\"{a}nder},
language = {ger},
number = {901},
publisher = {Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)},
title = {Strategisches Nachverhandeln zur L\"{o}sung von Anreizproblemen in unvollst\"{a}ndigen Vertr\"{a}gen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetz},
type = {Kiel Working Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2244},
year = {1998}
}
