@techreport{Bischoff2003Party,
abstract = {This paper provides a theoretical model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate.
The latter consists of numerous groups of dominant-issue-voters who base their voting decision
primarily on one issue of the political agenda. Parties follow a lexicographic objective
function, aiming to gain power at minimum programmatic concessions. The emerging pattern
of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence
proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference,
its extreme ends, occupied by dominant-issue-voters, attract the policy platforms. The
difference in policy platforms is not reduced. The conclusions are found to be compatible with
some major empirical findings of the Manifesto Research Group.},
address = {Gie\ss{}en},
author = {Ivo Bischoff},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {330; voters; incomplete information; political parties; convergence; \"{O}konomische Theorie der Demokratie; Politische Entscheidung; Politische Partei; Wettbewerb; Median Voter; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {68},
publisher = {Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.},
title = {Party competition in a heterogeneous electorate \textendash{} the role of dominant-issue-voters},
type = {Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22374},
year = {2003}
}
