@techreport{Krause2004role,
abstract = {The present paper investigates the neglected topic of budgeting rules for public bureaucracies
performing governmental activities within predetermined budgets under rules governing
expenditure levels and composition. We analyze the optimal budgeting scheme, if the
bureaucracy has superior information vis \textendash{} vis the policymaker. It is tasked with supplying
different types of public goods and is subject to costly audits. The optimal budgeting scheme
for the bureaucracy is determined. It is shown that it crucially depends on the level of auditing
costs. The same holds for the extent of discretion given to the bureaucracy about levels and
composition of public expenditures.},
author = {G\"{u}nter Krause},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H61; H41; 330; \"{O}ffentliche Finanzplanung; B\"{u}rokratietheorie; \"{O}ffentliches Gut; Asymmetrische Information; \"{O}ffentliche Finanzkontrolle; Kosten; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {51},
title = {On the role of budgeting in the delegated provision of public goods under asymmetric information},
type = {W\"{u}rzburg economic papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22344},
year = {2004}
}
