@techreport{Penov2004Institutional,
abstract = {This paper investigates a local problem of common pool resources (CPR), the solution
of which needs a balance between the collective and private interests. In the political
context we have a large group of actors with a short planning horizon and a lack of trust
among them. CPR provision is organised in a centralised way. The state enforcement
mechanism is weak and cannot protect the individuals or eventually back the collective
decisions. The above problem is investigated in the case of irrigation in Bulgaria where
water usage declined by nearly 85% during the period of transition. In addition, large
parts of the existing canal systems were abandoned. Three groups of institutional options
are investigated in the paper: improvement of the local level co-ordination; limiting
the market imperfections, and strengthening the external conflict resolution and
sanctioning mechanisms. The investigation of the above case led the author to conclusions
that can be generalised for the case of CPR management during the period of transition.
The transition process is not just a process of transferring western institutions to
Eastern Europe, but also a process of spontaneous emerging of new institutions at local
level. Therefore, we call for state intervention, not in the area of CPR provision, but in
supporting local co-ordination.},
author = {Ivan Penov},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {330; Bew\"{a}sserung; Allmenderessource; Agrarverfassung; Bulgarien},
language = {eng},
number = {2004,2},
title = {Institutional options for sustainable irrigation : an evidence from Bulgaria},
type = {CEESA discussion paper / Humboldt-Universit\"{a}t Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22302},
year = {2004}
}
