@techreport{Traub2003Federalism,
abstract = {In this paper, we take up the question why a group of sovereign
countries is willing to form a federation even if residents of the high-income
region suspect potential immigrants to be net beneficiaries of the tax and
transfer system. We argue that income uncertainty alone cannot satisfactorily
explain the formation of federations, since in many existing and developing
federations income differences are both large and persistent. In the
model presented here remaining separated involves costs for the high-income
region, which can be regarded as a proxy for the efficiency loss caused if mobile factors cannot reallocate. A fiscal equalization scheme that shares the
resources saved by limiting costly migration between the regions can make
both regions better off.},
author = {Stefan Traub},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D63; H40; H77; D78; 330; Federalism; Migration; Fiscal Equalization; F\"{o}deralismus; Finanzausgleich; Finanzf\"{o}deralismus; Regionale Einkommensverteilung; Internationale Wanderung; Internationale Faktormobilit\"{a}t; Allokationseffizienz; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Theorie},
language = {eng},
note = {urn:nbn:de:101:1-200911021986},
number = {2003,06},
title = {Federalism, Freedom of Movement, and Fiscal Equalization},
type = {Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universit\"{a}t Kiel, Department of Economics},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22066},
year = {2003}
}
