@techreport{vandenBerg2005Moral,
abstract = {This paper tests empirically for ex-post moral hazard in a system based on demand-side
subsidies. In the Netherlands, demand-side subsidies were introduced in 1996. Clients
receive a cash benefit to purchase the type of home care (housework, personal care, support
with mobility, organisational tasks or social support) they need from the care supplier of their
choice (private care provider, regular care agency, commercial care agency or paid informal
care provider). Furthermore, they negotiate with the care supplier about price and quantity.
Our main findings are the following. 1) The component of the cash benefit a client has no
residual claimant on, has a positive impact on the price of care. 2) In contrast, the
components of the cash benefit a client has residual claimant on, have no or a negative
impact on the price of care. Both results point at the existence of ex-post moral hazard in a
system of demand-side subsidies.},
author = {Bernard van den Berg and Wolter H.J. Hassink},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {I10; 330; long-term care; cash benefits; consumer directed services; demand-side subsidies; direct payments; moral hazard},
language = {eng},
number = {1532},
title = {Moral Hazard and Cash Benefits in Long-Term Home Care},
type = {IZA Discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21308},
year = {2005}
}
