@techreport{Albrecht2001Using,
abstract = {This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use
education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is
otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower
educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so
we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.},
author = {James Albrecht and Jan C. van Ours},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {I20; 330; Recruitment; signaling; Personalbeschaffung; Qualifikation; Signalling; Sch\"{a}tzung; Niederlande},
language = {eng},
number = {399},
title = {Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis},
type = {IZA Discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21259},
year = {2001}
}
