@techreport{Shields2001Stakeholders,
abstract = {We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that
enjoy benefits upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of this third
party involvement. Our main finding is that the potential willingness of the stakeholder to
make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency.
However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better
for the stakeholder than if he enters bargaining directly. Our results lend support to the
tendency towards decentralisation of pay bargaining in the public sector in Europe.},
author = {Michael A. Shields and Stephen Wheatley Price},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C78; 330; Bargaining; public sector; stakeholders; strikes; labour relations; Verhandlungstheorie; \"{O}ffentlicher Dienst; Lohnverhandlungstheorie; Streik; Agency Theory; Stakeholder; Firmentarifvertrag; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {395},
title = {Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes},
type = {IZA Discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21255},
year = {2001}
}
