@techreport{Wauthy2001Does,
abstract = {We consider a continuum of workers ranked according to their abilities to acquire education
and two firms with different technologies that imperfectly compete in wages to attract these
workers. Once employed, each worker bears an education cost proportional to his/her initial
ability, this cost being higher in the high-technology firm. At the Nash equilibrium, we show
that the unemployed workers are those with the lowest initial abilities. We then study
different policies that subsidy either the education cost or wages and compare them. We
found that the first best allocation can only be implemented by selective policies. We then
analyze second best non-selective policies that do not discriminate between workers and
firms and show that, in terms of welfare, subsidizing education costs or wages is strictly
equivalent.},
author = {Xavier Wauthy and Yves Zenou},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H20; J31; L13; 330; Nash equilibrium in wages; heterogeneous workers and firms; inequality; unemployment policies; Arbeitsmarkt; Lohn; Humankapital; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb; Arbeitsmarktpolitik; Qualifikation; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {340},
title = {How Does Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market Affect Unemployment Policies?},
type = {IZA Discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21198},
year = {2001}
}
