@techreport{Schnedler2000gets,
abstract = {Contract theory predicts that workers are remunerated based on all available unbiased individual
performance measures. In the real world, measures are often biased: tasks are too complex to
include all measures, unforeseen contingencies occur for which contracts specify nothing, and
the necessity of cooperation and coordination at tasks would be undermined by purely individual
measures. Hence, alternative incentive mechanisms are employed (implicit contracts, efficiency
wages, wage profiles, tournaments). This suggests that bonus pay is linked to task
characteristics: complex tasks will be negatively related to bonus pay, unforeseen contingencies
and the necessity to cooperate or coordinate will be positively correlated to premiums on
aggregated levels such as team or firm bonus. The present article explores these relations using
a French cross-sectional micro-data set. While complexity is found not to be negatively related to
bonus pay, the other two effects are supported by the data.},
author = {Wendelin Schnedler},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {J33; 330; Incentive schemes; bonus pay; three-variate probit; Leistungsorientierte Verg\"{u}tung; Anforderungsprofil; Leistungsanreiz; Anreizvertrag; Sch\"{a}tzung; Frankreich},
language = {eng},
number = {235},
title = {Who gets the Reward? An Empirical Exploration of Bonus Pay and Task Characteristics},
type = {IZA Discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21082},
year = {2000}
}
