@techreport{Hart2000Wages,
abstract = {We investigate wage-hours contracts within a four-period rent sharing model that incorporates
asymmetric information. Distinctions are made among (a) an investment period, (b) a period in
which the parties may separate (quits or layoffs) or continue rent accumulation and sharing, (c) a
post investment period and, (d) retirement. We establish that increases in both wage rates and
hours of work in the post-investment period serve to minimise sub-optimal separations and,
moreover that both wage and hours schedules are concave. The model is tested with the British
Household Panel Survey (1991-1997) and with the British Labour Force Survey (1993/4).},
author = {Robert A. Hart and Yue Ma},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {J33; J41; 330; Lifetime wage-hours contracts; asymmetric information; estimated wage- and hourtenure profiles; Arbeitsvertrag; Lohnverhandlungstheorie; Arbeitszeit; Bildungsinvestition; Lebenszyklus; Sch\"{a}tzung; Theorie; Gro\ss{}britannien},
language = {eng},
number = {139},
title = {Wages, Hours and Human Capital over the Life Cycle},
type = {IZA Discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20979},
year = {2000}
}
