@techreport{Brunello2000Ownership,
abstract = {This paper studies the turnover of board of directors members in a sample of 72 companies
listed on the Milan Stock Exchange during the period 1988-1996. We investigate whether
board members change more frequently when company performance is poor, as the
literature suggests, and whether and how the ownership structure of Italian companies
affects these relationships. We find that there is a statistically significant and negative
relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover and that this relationship depends
on the ownership structure of firms. Turnover is lower in family controlled firms and higher in
firms that experienced a change in the controlling shareholder. The latter firms also have a
stronger turnover-performance relationship. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that
changes in control are an extreme form of turnover. We also find evidence of a monitoring
role of the second largest shareholder. Also the turnover of top executives exhibits a
negative relationship with performance. Board turnover instead is unrelated to performance
but is related to the firm?s ownership structure. Overall our findings suggest that the
characteristics of the Italian economy deeply affect the turnover of directors and have
implications that go beyond the specific case study.},
author = {Giorgio Brunello and Clara Graziano and Bruno Maria Parigi},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {J63; G34; 330; Board of directors; corporate governance; financial agency; Arbeitsmobilit\"{a}t; Vorstand; Eigent\"{u}merstruktur; Corporate Governance; Unternehmensentwicklung; Italien},
language = {eng},
number = {105},
title = {Ownership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?},
type = {IZA Discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20945},
year = {2000}
}
