@techreport{Daniel2004Does,
abstract = {Perhaps it does. We propose a model in which workers with little education or in the tails of
the age distribution \textendash{} the inexperienced and the old \textendash{} have more chance of job failure
(mismatch). Recruits? average education should then increase and the standard deviation of
starting age decrease when strict employment protection raises hiring and firing costs. We
test the model using annual distributions of recruits? characteristics from a 1975-95 panel of
plants in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, the UK and the US. The model?s predictions are
supported using the Blanchard-Wolfers index of employment protection as well as our
alternative index.},
author = {Kirsten Daniel and William Stanley Siebert},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {J83; J21; 330; employment protection; labor demand; unskilled workers; firm panel data; K\"{u}ndigungsschutz; Ungelernte Arbeitskr\"{a}fte; Arbeitsnachfrage; Sch\"{a}tzung; Belgien; Niederlande; Italien; Grossbritannien; Vereinigte Staaten},
language = {eng},
number = {1290},
title = {Does Employment Protection Reduce the Demand for Unskilled Labor?},
type = {IZA Discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20556},
year = {2004}
}
