@techreport{Koskela2004Profit,
abstract = {We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium
unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous
outside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a
general equilibrium with endogenous outside options this relationship is frequently reversed;
reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market
imperfections \textendash{} measured by the bargaining power of trade unions - are sufficiently strong
and benefit-replacement ratio high enough. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks
increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.},
author = {Erkki Koskela and Rune Stenbacka},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {G32; J41; J51; 330; wage and loan bargaining; compensation systems; equilibrium unemployment; outside options; Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit; Gleichgewicht; Tarifliche Gewinnbeteiligung; Kreditmarkt; Unvollkommener Markt; Lohnverhandlungstheorie; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1020},
title = {Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment},
type = {IZA Discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20255},
year = {2004}
}
