@techreport{Irlenbusch2003Transparency,
abstract = {The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no
significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases.},
author = {Bernd Irlenbusch and Dirk Sliwka},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; J33; C91; 330; transparency; reciprocity; reputation; gift exchange; inequity aversion; Arbeitsvertrag; Agency Theory; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Gerechtigkeit; Experiment; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {887},
title = {Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations},
type = {IZA Discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126},
year = {2003}
}
