@techreport{Joosten2005small,
abstract = {Two agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they
have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed
net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net.
The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch
than the alternative. The present catches depend on the behavior of
the agents in the past. The more often the agents have used the fine-
mazed net in the past, the lower the present catches are independent
from the type of nets being used.
We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equi-
libria for the limiting average reward criterion using methods inspired
by the repeated-games literature. Our analysis shows that a 'tragedy of
the commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes
can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria.},
author = {Reinoud Joosten},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C73; C72; Q22; Q20; 330; games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs; limiting average reward; equilibria; renewable common-pool resources; Allmenderessource; Erneuerbare Ressourcen; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Dynamisches Spiel; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {0506},
title = {A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs},
type = {Papers on economics & evolution},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025},
year = {2005}
}
