@techreport{Hellwig2004Optimal,
abstract = {The paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear income
taxation, public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy.
With asymmetric information about labour productivities and publicgoods
preferences, the multidimensional mechanism design problem
becomes tractable by requiring renegotiation proofness of the final allocation
of private goods and admission tickets for excludable public
goods. Under an affiliation assumption on the underlying distribution,
optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and admission
fees have the same qualitative properties as in unidimensional models.
These properties are obtained for utilitarian welfare maximization
and for a Ramsey-Boiteux formulation with interim participation constraints.},
author = {Martin Hellwig},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; H20; H40; 330; Optimal Income Taxation; Public Goods; Public-Sector Pricing; Multidimensional Mechanism Design; Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing; Optimale Besteuerung; \"{O}ffentliches Gut; Ramsey-Preis; Geb\"{u}hr; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2004/14},
title = {Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing : A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics},
type = {Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19896},
year = {2004}
}
