@techreport{Koetter2005Accounting,
abstract = {The inability of most bank merger studies to control for hidden bailouts may
lead to biased results. In this study, we employ a unique data set of approximately
1,000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use
data on the regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed
and non-distressed mergers. We find that, among merging banks, distressed
banks had the worst profiles and acquirers perform somewhat better than targets.
However, both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL
profiles than our control group. In fact, non-distressed mergers may be motivated
by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent
regulatory intervention.},
author = {Michael Koetter and Jaap W. B. Bos and Frank Heid and Clemens J. M. Kool and James W. Kolari and Daniel Porath},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {G21; G14; G34; 330; Mergers; bailout; X-efficiency; multinomial logit; Bank; Fusion; \"{U}bernahme; Unternehmenssanierung; Bankinsolvenz; Sch\"{a}tzung; Deutschland},
language = {eng},
number = {2005,09},
title = {Accounting for distress in bank mergers},
type = {Discussion Paper, Series 2: Banking and Financial Supervision},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19742},
year = {2005}
}
