@techreport{Rocholl2005Discriminatory,
abstract = {This paper examines the results of 93 discriminatory German Treasury auctions between
1998 and 2002. It documents the seller's use of discretion and its influence on auction outcomes
and bidding strategies. The evidence suggests that the seller uses its discretion frequently
and substantially. It does not maximize revenues in a single-period game, but moves
up in the competitive demand curve to set the auction price close to the market price. Bidders
do not make profits in German auctions on average, while their bidding strategies reflect
the uncertainty created by the seller's discretion. The paper extends and tests the multi-unit
auction model by Lengwiler (1999). The empirical evidence is consistent with the implication
that the market-clearing price depends on the seller's marginal cost rather than on the
submitted demand.},
author = {J\"{o}rg Rocholl},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H63; G28; 330; Discriminatory auctions; Winner's curse; Seller discretion; Schatzpapier; \"{O}ffentliche Anleihe; Wertpapieremission; Auktionstheorie; Wiederholte Spiele; Sch\"{a}tzung; Deutschland},
language = {eng},
number = {2005,15},
title = {Discriminatory auctions with seller discretion: evidence from German treasury auctions},
type = {Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19523},
year = {2005}
}
