@techreport{Englmaier2006Information,
abstract = {The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate
investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination
problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate
information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that
subsidies may be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in
information provision. In addition we point out possible problems with overreaction to public
information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy.},
author = {Florian Englmaier and Markus Reisinger},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; F21; D82; O14; O12; C79; 330; information; coordination; industrialization; development; global games; equilibrium refinements; big push; Industrialisierung; Investition; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Investitionspolitik; Entwicklungspolitik; Gleichgewicht},
language = {eng},
number = {1670},
title = {Information, coordination, and the industrialization of countries},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19134},
year = {2006}
}
